In it, after a prehmlnary explanation of basic concepts and terms (Book I), Boethius sets out two systems or classifications on the topics used m dmlectmal reasoning. ThemlsnUS'S classification (Book 2) and C. mero's/Book 3) He then shows how each on the two may be reduced to the other (Book 3) and contrasts both classifications with the topics used in rhetorical reasoning (Book 4) Much of this material will strike the nonspeciahst as quite foreign--and perhaps of dubious interest. To overcome this, Stump has supplemented her translation with an lntroduct~on, very ample and detailed notes, and, in Part 2 of her book, a set of six essays three on the changes and developments m the notion of dialectic and of a dialectical "'topic" from Aristotle to Boethius ("Dmlectlc and Aristotle's Topics," "'Dialectic and Boethlus's De toptct~, dtfferentti,s," and "'Between Aristotle and Boethius"), one on the development after Boethius I'Peter of Spain on the Topics"), and two on technical notions in Boethlus's tract ~tself I'Dlfferenua and the Porphynan Tree," and "'Differentia"). Although there ~s considerable cross-referencing, the six essay's are for the most part self-contained and may be read independently of one another (This is less true for "Peter of Spain on the Topics.") There are also indices and a full bibliography' Stump's translation is based on Mlgne's text in the Patrologta latma (vol 64, cols. 1173~1216), supplemented by the edmon of Basel 1570 (from which the Migne text is apparently' copied) and Paris 1537, and by the Orleans manuscript 267. A spot check against the Latin shows the translatmn to be quite faithful. 1 found only two small points to quibble over At page 44, line 37, In the phrase "'as though the matter were so in all other cases too," the suggestion of counterfactuahty spoils Boethtus's point. The Latin has the present subjunctive, and should be translated "as if the matter should be so .
"' Again, on page 72, in lines 36-37, the Enghsh sentence is ill-formed. Perhaps a word has been omitted. In any' case, it appears that Stump has read the edmon's "ordlentes" as "'orientes." I would translate the sentence, "'According to this method, let us set the whole division of Cicero and Themlstms side by' side from the begmmng, and let us.. '"
There is one point in Stump's introduction that 1 think is mistaken On pages 25-26 she says:
For Abelard, a Topic p, an mterence rule that helps one fred ,.,.hat is missing m enthymemes Enthymemes. or "unperfect s~lloD~ms,'" are ,.ahd not formally but because ot a certain relanonsh~p between the term', The Topic makes such references formally vahd because ~t pro,,'Mes a rule or law founded on a certain relatumsh~p between the things s~gnlfied by the term,,, for example Whatc,,er the specie', is predmated of. thc genu~ [of that spemes] zs also predmated of (The addmon IS Stump".) This is confusing. An Abelardlan Topic appears to be both a statement ("law") and an inferencerule, If it is a rule, |ormally vahdatlng certain inferences, then the inferences so validated are formally valid. But we are told in the second sentence that they are "valid not formally '" On the other hand, if the topic ts a statement that, when added to the premise and conclusion of an enthymeme, makes it formally valid, then Stump's example will not work. The enthymeme "'If It is a man, it is an animal" (Abelard's illustration) is not made formally vahd by adding the premise Stump gives (unless there is an unusual nouon of formahty at play here that ought to bc explained).
One would also have to add the premise "'Ammal is the genus of the specms man. Phillips pays far closer attention than most intellectual historians to the genre, structure, and language of his texts. He has a sharp eye for significant features, even small ones, of tone and wording. And he is convincing when he tries to elicit the ideas that generate such features of style. Accordingly, he has been able to show in far greater detail than his predecessors how Guicciardini's historical theory and practice changed in the course of time.
Phillips begins with Guicclardini's apprentice works on the history of his famdy and of Florence. which he convincingly assesses as a mixture of promise and convention. Continuing the work of V. de Caprariis, whom he attacks, and F. Gilbert, on whom he rehes, Phillips then traces through the recensions of the Ricordi Guicciardlni's loss of faith in the possibility of drawing simple, constructive lessons from history. Finally, in several lucid chapters he shows that Guicclardlnl's History ofltaly can be seen as a great symphonic elaboration on the themes of the irrationality of human affairs, the weakness of reason, and the overwhelming power of Fortune. He persuasively argues that Guicciardini's presentation of character, portrayal of events, and even his choice of metaphors all stemmed from the historical pessimism of his later years. Phdhps's work will be an invaluable Baedeker for any scholar brave enough to tackle the two thousand largely uncharted pages of the History And it will be a pleasant guide as well as an informative one, for he writes clear and engaging prose, well spiced with homely and striking metaphors.
If I have doubts about Phillips's work, they concern not the value of his analyses per se but the validity of so strictly literary an approach. Phillips is clearly aware that such objections can be raised, and he tries to avert them: "I have chosen," he writes at the outset, "not to risk broadening the base of my enquiry at the cost of blunting its point" (p. x). Yet it seems to me that if Phillips had done more of the sort of research traditionally associated with intellectual history, he would have enriched rather than weakened his literary analysis.
In the first place, narrative is only half of the historian's craft. Research is the other; and in Renaissance Florence, as Santini and others have shown, the best historians were assiduous hunters and weighers of sources. ~ Even the Ciceronian description of history as a branch of rhetoric stated that the historian must tell the truth (De oratore II. xv). And most Renaissance historians knew perfectly well how hard it is to elicit the truth about the past from the bedlam of conflicting testimonies produced by witnesses blinded by bias and affection.-" Gulcciardini too, as Phillips admits, was an active researcher. Indeed, for a Florentine patrician of his generation, he was quite an archive rat. He also engaged in a long and careful confrontation with earlier historians of the events he portrayed--men such as Glrolamo Borgia, whose unpublished F. Gilbert, Machiavelh and Guzcciardmt: Polmcs and Htstoc~ in Stxteenth-Centuo" Florence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965) , hsts the main studies on pp 333-35. z See e.g , L. Valla, Gesta Ferdmandt regts Aragonum ed. O. Besoml (Padua. Antenore, 1973), pp. 7-8 
